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For a Restructure of the Financial System 
 
My understanding of the crisis (and maybe others’) has built up layer by layer. One 
layer is the lessons of my structuralist models from the 1990s. When the speculative 
vision is seen to be a mirage, the asset prices drop back. Yet the stocks of the various 
assets remain somewhat elevated relative to their starting point and, as a result, so are 
the real prices of the assets (!).2 Then the stocks and their real prices slowly shrink to 
their normal level. Gross investment activity (and employment) may be elevated too 
(but not enough to prevent declining stocks), owing to the elevation of assets’ real 
prices, though receding, or may be depressed, owing to the increased wealth people 
own, though recovering as assets and wealth sink back to normal. Whichever is the 
case, I don’t see this as a tragedy! 
 
In another structuralist story – aspects of which I later worked on with Amar 
Bhidé – China embraces a sort of state capitalism, whereupon its productivity climbs 
steeply – far ahead of the absorption capacities of consumption demand and 
investment demand; so imports lag behind exports. This imbalance is met with 
jubilation in America, where the prospect of an era of low world real interest rates 
launches the general level of asset prices on an upward path toward heretofore unseen 
levels and triggers boom in the favored industries. This story is no tragedy either. 
 
But why has the end of the recent boom been so destructive? And why is there a 
widely held sense that no return to high prosperity is in prospect? Answering these 
questions requires another layer of explanation. 
 
Last summer I saw the possibility of one answer. The “uncertainty premium” 
drives a wedge between the value placed on another unit of the asset and the cost of 
its production; and an increase of the premium widens the wedge, thus contracting the 
“natural” level of employment.3 And much of the uncertainty springs from the 
indebtedness of households and banks, which has put them in a precarious position. 
•A great many people borrowed to the hilt, taking advantage of the extraordinarily 
attractive terms that became available, in order to own their home or a bigger home or 
a second home. Some speculators simply wanted to buy a house or two or even more 
in the expectation that the capital gains would more than compensate for tying up 
their capital in a down payment. By 2007 household debt was a whopping 100% of 
the GDP that year. In taking on so very much debt, American households were 
making themselves extremely vulnerable to economic distress in the event that 
housing prices suffered the correction that occurred – one that many economists 
(including Bob Aliber and Bob Shiller) were forecasting. 
                                               
2  The rise in the housing stock decreases the price of housing services relative to the nominal 
price of houses, thus to increase the relative price of houses – that is, the real prices of houses. 
3  "A View of Monetary Policy From Our 'Structuralist' and Uncertain Economies,” 7th Annual 
BIS Conference on Monetary Policy, Luzern, June 26-27, 2008. 
 3 
•The banks also borrowed massive amounts, leveraging an essentially unchanged 
amount of capital, in order to acquire massive loans and other assets. The gross debt 
of the financial sector rose to 117% of GDP in the third quarter of 2008. Thus the 
banks made themselves extremely vulnerable to the correction of housing prices that 
occurred. With the fall of asset prices, many of the banks are nearly insolvent. They 
cannot raise more capital without extreme dilution, and have no appetite for making 
added loans, which would add to their precariousness. 
 
But what explains the huge rise of indebtedness? A part of the puzzle is explained 
by Leo Tilman’s book Financial Darwinism. The influx of capital into the U.S. 
looking for returns, in driving asset prices up and interest rates down, made it 
impossible for the typical bank, commercial or investment-type, to hit its target rate of 
return. It responded by “reaching for return,” as James Tobin used to put it – by 
borrowing more in order to lend more, thus leveraging its capital. But as all banks 
increased their leverage, asset prices were driven higher. The banks were chasing 
their tail. I think there was little or no share price appreciation in real terms at U.S. 
banks between, say, 1999 and 2007. (This runs contrary to the impression that the 
banks were making tremendous rates of return. They were making reduced rates on 
assets having higher prices, so profits rose.) 
 
I suggest that Washington played a pervasive role as well through its actions and 
its influence on social fashion. Legislation and government pressure managed to 
increase an important increase in the supply of credit for housing. 
•Until 1997 the “rollover” law exempted those selling their homes from capital 
gains tax provided they purchased another, more expensive home in the allotted time. 
The subsequent Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997 excluded the first $500,000 from the 
capital gains tax on a home held and lived in for 2 of the last 5 years. This invited 
people to buy a home on the speculation that they could flip it within 2 years and 
exclude the $500,000. 
•The federal government put unmistakable pressure on banks to expand their 
residential mortgage lending. 
•Fannie May and Freddie Mac, established to buy residential mortgages, were 
pressured by Congressional leaders to ramp up their purchases – no matter the risks 
that would seem to have posed for the investors, such as China. Later, the investors 
were given to believe that their holdings were guaranteed, so as to hold down the cost 
of capital for Fannie May and Freddie Mac. 
 
I would argue also that the fashion in the present decade for more and better and 
bigger houses stimulated an increase in demand for houses – beyond that produced by 
the worldwide decline in real interest rates – and an increase in demand for credit to 
help finance the purchases. 
•In the wake of 9/11, President Bush urged American households to step up their 
consumption spending. The argument was that increased spending is good for 
employment and will be repaid with increased income – Keynes’s paradox of thrift. 
No actual decline of wealth will have to be incurred! Franklin’s “a penny saved is a 
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penny earned” was replaced by “a penny spent is a penny earned.” 
•A year or two later, the executive branch, in connection with the re-election 
campaign if I am not mistaken, promulgated the concept of an “ownership society.” 
That did not mean owning stocks and bonds so much as it meant – at least for most 
people – owning your own home. 
•Recently, the political movement achieved the final articulation of its goal. 
Coolidge famously said that “the chief business of America is business” and that was 
true from the early settlers to well into the 20th century. What came to be called the 
American Dream was a successful and rewarding career – “making it” in the sense of 
making a high enough salary to pay for the primary goods, to have economic 
independence, but also a having a career of meeting challenges, taking initiative and 
exploring for new possibilities. Washington somehow managed to change the 
American Dream to Home Ownership. 
 
Both the home ownership craze and the push on the financial sector to supply 
more credit for home buying operated to divert some of the world’s capital from U.S. 
business, where it would have gone, into housing. Susan Lee (2008) recalls a book by 
Edwin Mills (1987) arguing that the GDP would be 5% to 10% higher if capital were 
to be allocated neutrally between housing and business. 
 
Yet another effect, as Amity Shlaes and I argued in one of her Bloomberg 
columns (2007), is that an additional housing stock lessens the mobility of labor. Still 
another effect is that occupant ownership – or owner occupancy – is an impediment if 
not a barrier to widescale community improvement, as shown years ago by Andrew 
Winston and Otto Davis (1962). 
 
Finally, there is the effect on dynamism. It is a fact that in the 1990s, innovation, 
such as it was, depended largely on the meager capital of a small heroic band of angel 
investors and venture capitalists. Nevertheless, there were 350 initial public offerings 
per year in the 1990s. Now, in the 2000s, the fires of innovation have been dying 
down. The number of IPOs per year in the 2006 has been only 50 per annum. Perhaps 
the housing boom did not wholly cause the shift of capital away from innovation. 
However, the housing boom, in drawing some capital into housing that would 
otherwise have gone into venture capital and hedge funds, must have done some 
damage to the dynamism of the economy – thus to the rate of innovation. 
 
The crucial task starting now, in 2009, before it is too late, will be to restructure, 
or reconfigure, the financial sector so that it becomes less of a conduit for mortgage 
lending for residential and commercial construction – and more a set of well-
functioning institutions with the expertise to make lending decisions for business 
investment and business innovation! 
 
This is urgent, since what the government seems to want now is to restore not just 
construction activity in the housing industry but to restore the previous role that the 
entire housing market played in the lives of consumers and, in turn, Wall Street. 
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I am not the right economist to say precisely how this is best done. But I do have 
the “vision thing.” U.S. housing has banks dedicated to it that were set up by the U.S. 
government. Agriculture also has a network of dedicated banks serving the financing 
needs of farmers. It would be harder to dismantle those aids to particular factions in 
America than to set up a counterweight. The government could sponsor the creation 
of financial companies of a new kind: regional or state-wide banks dedicated to 
serving the business sector – particularly the needs for finance of long-term 
investment and innovation. 
 
We might do well to model a new class of banks – financial entities, if you prefer 
– after the investment banks of the 1870s, such as Deutsche Bank. “In the 1880s and 
1890s it played a major part in the development of Germany’s electrical-engineering 
industry.” (Company history, p.2.) It became a lender to the Edison Company in those 
years. 
 
It may be that the political forces behind Home Ownership will aim to “put 
Humpty Dumpty together again.” Yet perhaps we can persuade them to strike out in 
the new direction I have sketched here. 
 
Thank you. 
